When inferring unknown parameters or comparing different models, data must be compared to underlying theory. Even if a model has no closed-form solution to derive summary statistics, it is often still possible to simulate mock data in order to generate theoretical predictions. For realistic simulations of noisy data, this is identical to drawing realisations of the data from a likelihood distribution. Though the estimated summary statistic from simulated data vectors may be unbiased, the estimator has variance which should be accounted for. We show how to correct the likelihood in the presence of an estimated summary statistic by marginalising over the true summary statistic. For Gaussian likelihoods where the covariance must also be estimated from simulations, we present an alteration to the Sellentin-Heavens corrected likelihood. We show that excluding the proposed correction leads to an incorrect estimate of the Bayesian evidence with JLA data. The correction is highly relevant for cosmological inference that relies on simulated data for theory (e.g. weak lensing peak statistics and simulated power spectra) and can reduce the number of simulations required.
INTRODUCTION
It was recently noted by Sellentin & Heavens (2016) that the common practice of debiasing a covariance matrix estimated from simulations of mock data (Hartlap et al. 2007 ) is insufficient. The sampling distribution of this estimated covariance should be incorporated into the likelihood distribution and, therefore, into the posterior distributions of the inferred parameters. Failure to do so leads to biased and overly-optimistic inferences.
Here we note that it is increasingly common, especially in cosmological surveys, to attempt to make inferences from data d using theory summary statistics µ that can be obtained only from simulations. As with the estimated covariance described by Sellentin & Heavens (2016) , an estimated summary statisticμ, though unbiased, is itself a random variable, drawn from a sampling distribution with associated variance. This variance, if unaccounted for, will lead to inaccurate parameter inference and misleading model comparison results.
One example, currently popular in cosmology, is weak lensing peak statistics (Dietrich & Hartlap 2010; Kacprzak et al. 2016; Peel et al. 2017; Shan et al. 2017; Martinet et al. E-mail: niall.jeffrey.15@ucl.ac.uk 2017). Weak lensing peak statistics broadly aim to use the number of density peaks in the cosmological matter distribution to constrain cosmological parameters and models. The number of peaks in the density field (or weak lensing signal) is the result of highly non-linear structure formation and large-volume dark matter simulation are often needed to generate the theoretical number. The number of peaks in a given simulation is stochastic due to cosmic variance and then further sources of noise are added to simulate realistic observed data.
The data d does not refer to the raw data (e.g. maps or galaxy catalogues), but are the observed summary statistic. For example, d could be the observed number of peaks in a weak lensing mass map reconstruction (Kacprzak et al. 2016; Jeffrey et al. 2018) .
In Section 2 we show how to marginalise over possible summary statistics µ to derive the likelihood P(d |μ), the probability of the data d conditional on the estimated summary statisticμ. In Section 3, we consider the case in which the naive likelihood is Gaussian, and derive the corrected likelihood distribution in the presence of both known and unknown (estimated) covariance matrices. In Section 4, we use a one-dimensional toy model to demonstrate the effect of estimated summary statistics; we show that the corrected likelihood distribution matches samples generated from the toy model. In Section 5, we use the public JLA supernovae data to show the effect of estimating summary statistics from simulations, using draws from the known likelihood as mock simulations.
LIKELIHOOD CORRECTION
If we have a known 1 summary statistic µ(θ), where θ are the unknown parameters of interest, then data d are distributed according to the likelihood distribution P(d | µ, α), where α are other parameters such as the covariance.
If it is not possible to calculate the summary statistic µ we assume we can estimate it using M simulated data realisations d sim . The estimate is often the mean
where each i th data realisation is independent. In some cases, the summary statistic may not be the mean of the likelihood, and the estimatorμ would be another function of the simulated data. Even ifμ is an unbiased estimate (that is, μ = µ), it is often mistakenly assumed that
which is not generally correct. In the scenario described, one cannot know P(d | µ, α), as µ itself is an unknown random variable.
The correct likelihood to be used for parameter inference is
which can be rewritten as a marginalisation over the true summary statistic
This is the most general form, but each factor can be evaluated for certain forms of the likelihood. The first factor in the final integral is the naive likelihood that would be used if the summary statistic µ could be calculated.
The second factor in the final integral is a sampling distribution ofμ. If our simulated datasets d sim,i are independent and realistic, then each is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) draw from the naive likelihood distribution, that is,
If we know the naive likelihood distribution (but not, of course, the actual value of µ), then based on our definition
1 By known, we mean that µ(θ) can be calculated for a given θ.
in equation 1, it is usually possible to evaluate the sampling distribution P(μ | µ, M, α). The final factor in the final integral of equation 4 is the prior on the summary statistic µ.
GAUSSIAN NAIVE LIKELIHOOD
For many cosmological analyses, the data d are assumed to be drawn from a Gaussian likelihood. In this section we derive the corrected likelihood for the case with known covariance (Section 3.1) and unknown (estimated) covariance (Section 3.2).
A Gaussian likelihood is usually an approximation, as there are likely to be some sources of non-Gaussian noise. It may be a very good approximation however. The Gaussian would be the maximum entropic, least informative, distribution for known mean and variance. By the central limit theorem it may be the correct distribution in some limit of large numbers. For example, in a survey to measure the matter power spectrum P(k), if the galaxies are a Poisson process, then for modes that average many galaxies (high k) the likelihood is approximately Gaussian. Similarly, if weak lensing peaks are Poissonian, the binned counts of peaks will be approximately Gaussian for large numbers of observed peaks.
For cases where the naive likelihood is non-Gaussian and one wishes to calculate the corrected likelihood (conditional on an estimated summary statisticμ), one should evaluate equation 4 analytically or numerically.
Known Covariance
Consider the case where the naive likelihood (conditional on the true summary statistic µ) is a Gaussian/normal distribution, such that
and the covariance Σ is assumed known. In this case, the sampling distribution is
It seems reasonable to use the Jeffreys' prior (Jeffreys 1946 , Jeffreys 1998 as an objective prior distribution for µ, which, for our Gaussian likelihood (equation 6), is uniform
This flat prior on µ, if unbounded, is formally improper. However, the resulting posterior distribution, P(µ |μ, M, Σ), is Gaussian and therefore a true probability distribution. With these distributions (equation 6-8) for a Gaussian naive likelihood, we perform the marginalisation integration (equation 4),
where x is a certain function of {d,μ, Σ, M} (but not µ) and X is a certain function of {Σ, M} 2 . The integration over µ removes the dependence on x. Normalising this gives the corrected likelihood:
For summary statisticsμ(θ) estimated from simulations, and where the likelihood distribution for data d conditional on the true (but unknown) µ(θ) is Gaussian with known covariance Σ, then equation 10 is the corrected form of the likelihood. It is this corrected likelihood that should be used for parameter inference. In this case, the corrected likelihood has the same Gaussian form as the naive likelihood, but with a scaled covariance. At first glance, this scaling could be mistaken for Bessel's correction for an unbiased estimate of the sample variance; however, here we actually know the covariance Σ and the added scaling comes from uncertainty in our estimateμ.
Unknown Covariance
In the previous section, we assumed that the summary statistic µ was estimated from simulations, but the covariance Σ was known. This situation is unlikely and it is foreseeable that both the summary statistic and covariance would also be estimated from simulated data.
The estimate of the covariance from N independent data simulations is given bŷ
where † is the conjugate transpose, andd sim =
is the just the estimated summary statistiĉ µ as given by equation 1 (but with N simulations, not M).
For the case where the summary statistic µ is not estimated from simulations, Sellentin & Heavens (2016) calculate the corrected likelihood
For a Gaussian naive likelihood P(d | µ, Σ) the distribution of the estimated covariance P(Ŝ | Σ, M) is Wishart. With these distributions and a Jeffreys prior for Σ, the resulting Sellentin-Heavens corrected likelihood is given by
where p is the number of elements in the data vector d (i.e. the dimensionality). This has the form of a multivariate tdistribution.
In the case considered in this work, we are assuming that the summary statistic µ cannot be calculated, and that we must estimateμ from simulations. The integral in equation 12 must then be replaced by
We note that the sample meanμ and sample covarianceŜ are independent, even if the simulated data used to estimate them are the same (Anderson 2003), so that P(μ,Ŝ) = P(μ) P(Ŝ). If the simulated data used to evaluateμ andŜ are the same, one can set N = M in what follows. If, as is often the case in cosmological analyses, the covariance is assumed not to vary with respect to the parameters of interest and is instead estimated once with more simulated data realisations, then N M.
Using the same distributions as described so far in Section 3, marginalising over the unknown true summary statistic µ and covariance Σ (equation 14) and renormalising gives the new corrected likelihood (details in Appendix A):
This corrected likelihood gives the probability of observing the data d conditional on an estimated mean summary statisticμ from M simulations and an estimated covariance matrixΣ from N simulations, where we have assumed that the naive likelihood is Gaussian.
TOY MODEL DEMONSTRATION
As a verification and demonstration of the result given in equation 10, whereμ is estimated from simulated data and Σ is known, we construct a toy model. This toy model also relies on the assumed flat prior on µ and the fact that the sampling distribution is symmetric with respect to µ andμ. Let us assume that in different realisations of an experiment, different experimenters randomly and independently generate M simulations, from whichμ is estimated according to equation 1. The underlying likelihood distribution for the data with known µ is Gaussian and therefore the simulated data are themselves i.i.d. draws from the Gaussian distribution (equation 6). Each experimenter then draws a realisation of the data d from the naive Gaussian likelihood distribution with the known variance and the mean given by their estimatedμ.
Though each experimenter draws their data realisation d from a Gaussian likelihood with the known variance Σ, the data realisations from all the experimenters will be distributed according to the corrected likelihood (equation 10) with variance M+1 M Σ. In figure 1 we take a one-dimensional case where µ = 42, Σ = π ≈ 3.14, and M = 2. We see that the data samples from 
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Naive distribution Corrected distribution Samples Figure 1 . One-dimensional toy model for the naive Gaussian likelihood with known variance, where µ = 42, Σ = π ≈ 3.14, and M = 2. The samples (described in Section 4) are distributed according to the corrected likelihood distribution (equation 10), whereas the naive likelihood distribution has reduced variance.
10 5 different experiments match the corrected likelihood distribution (equation 10), whereas the naive likelihood distribution underestimates the variance, as expected.
JLA SUPERNOVAE DEMONSTRATION
In this section, we use public type Ia supernova (SN Ia) data 3 from the SDSS-II/SNLS3 Joint Light-Curve Analysis (JLA) (Betoule et al. 2014 ) as a demonstration of the corrected likelihoods described in the previous sections. This is, of course, only a demonstration, as the summary statistic µ(θ) (SN Ia apparent magnitudes) can actually be calculated for the model considered. We generate simulated data by drawing realisations from the known likelihood (according to equation 5) 4 , and estimateμ. We can then constrain cosmological parameters using a likelihood distribution conditional on our estimatedμ.
Data and Model
The data are observed B-band peak apparent magnitudes d = {m B,obs,1 , m B,obs,2 , ...} for 740 SN Ia over a range of redshifts up to z = 1.3. The supernovae also have associated light-curve stretch X 1 , colour at maximum-brightness C and host stellar mass M stellar , which are included in the model and covariance. The data and associated covariance are shown in figure 2 .
We use the model from Betoule et al. (2014) where the SN Ia are standardizable candles with expected apparent magnitude where α and β are nuisance parameters for the stretch and colour respectively. M B is the absolute magnitude of the host with a correction term ∆M depending on M stellar (where Θ is the Heaviside function). We take a flat wCDM Universe, with luminosity distance
where c is the speed-of-light in a vacuum, H 0 is the Hubble parameter, Ω m is the matter density parameter, and w is the equation of state for dark energy. In our demonstration, the parameters of interest θ = (Ω m , w, M B ) are allowed to vary. For simplicity, we fix the other parameters: H 0 = 70.0 km s −1 Mpc −1 , ∆M = −0.05, α = 0.1256, β = 2.6342. The covariance is calculated according to Betoule et al. (2014) and is also fixed.
Likelihood and Priors
We assume a Gaussian likelihood, where the log-likelihood is given by:
where the data and covariance are those described in Section 5.1 (and shown in Fig. 2 ), and our summary statistic µ is the absolute magnitude given in equation 16. For simplicity we take uniform priors in the ranges: 0.05 ≤ Ω m ≤ 0.6, −1.5 ≤ w ≤ −0.3, −19.15 ≤ M B ≤ −18.95.
Simulations for this demonstration are run on a regular grid of shape [12, 13, 11] (for Ω m , w, M B ) spanning the prior range. The regular grid is a particularly poor choice to sample the posterior distribution when simulations are expensive. However, this is a demonstration, and for realworld analysis many better sampling schemes are available (including latin hypercubes and grid transformations to better sample the expected posterior distribution).
Once the posterior is evaluated at these grid positions, the parameter space is upsampled to a [48, 52, 44] grid. The new grid positions are evaluated by interpolating the posterior distribution from the original grid using a radial basis function 'thin plate' spline (Duchon 1976; Bookstein 1989; Jones et al. 2001 ). This spline interpolation worked particularly well in avoiding edge effects or artefacts around points when we compared their results with those of more poorlyperforming simple polynomial splines.
Results
First, let us imagine three different experimenters, who, despite having access to the same data (described above), run their own independent simulations to estimate the summary statisticsμ(θ) on the grid in parameter space. This results in differentμ i for i =1, 2, 3.
Evaluating the posterior distribution using the naive Gaussian likelihood set-up described in Section 5.2, and using M = 2 simulations per parameter grid position, results in the three posterior distributions in figure 3 . The three different experimenters have three different posterior distributions due to their differentμ i . Having different individual posterior distributions is in itself is not a problem. If different experiments have different data but the same underlying parameters, their resulting posterior distributions will look different, and will quantify their own individual uncertainty in the parameters. However, this variance of the data has been taken into account, and will be reflected in each posterior distribution. In the case of differentμ i in figure 3 , the fact thatμ was a random draw from a distribution (just like the data) has not been taken into account. As they have ignored the resulting correction to their likelihood, each experimenter will be overly optimistic about their own inferences.
In figure 4 , the posterior distribution has been calculated using the likelihood correction (equation 10), which takes into account the variance inμ i (using the µ summary statistic for clarity). Using ChainConsumer (Hinton 2016) , with M = 2 (we setμ = µ in this example for clarity). The contours are broader than in figure 3 as this likelihood takes into account that the estimated summary statistic is a draw from a sampling distribution.
we measure a 25 per cent increase in the determinant of the parameter covariance with the corrected likelihood. The resulting posterior distribution is slightly broader, reflecting the added uncertainty in the inference.
Model Comparison
The comparison of different theoretical models using the data in a Bayesian framework is usually done by calculating the Bayesian evidence:
Two models can be compared by evaluating the Bayes factor: If one has no reason to believe a given model more than another a priori, then the second factor (the ratio of the prior distributions) equals one. In this case, the Bayes factor becomes a ratio of the model probabilities (conditional on the data). We evaluate the Bayesian evidence (equation 19) for the three parameter case for the JLA analysis described in Section 5.2 with the uncorrected naive Gaussian likelihood and the corrected likelihood (equation 10) with M = 2. Calculating the Bayes factor gives 
forμ 1 ,μ 2 , andμ 3 respectively. As a check, after increasing the number of evaluated grid points by a factor of 4 we still calculate the same K values. Additionally, we calculate lnK using a different cosmological parametrisation, sampling scheme and data (Appendix B) and get similar results.
For all three, the corrected likelihood is more than a factor of exp[30] more probable than the uncorrected. This is further validation of the corrected likelihood; the model (i.e. the corrected likelihood) shows a better goodness-offit. Furthermore, if one were using an estimated summary statistic, but not using the corrected likelihood, one's belief in a model would be incorrect by this factor. This effect would be particularly harmful if comparing two models, where it is possible to calculate µ for the first, butμ is estimated from simulations for the second. Using the same Gaussian likelihood for both, without the correction for the second, would lead one to incorrectly favour the first model.
In figure 5 , the log Bayes factors ln K (equation 21) are shown for the three estimated summary statisticsμ i as a function of the number of simulations M. As the number of simulations increase, the error incurred by using the uncorrected likelihood decreases. The value asymptotes to, but will never reach, ln K = 1. For even a large number of simulations (large M), the error is not negligible. For many analyses, rather than running 10 2 expensive simulations, it would be better to use the corrected likelihood and avoid this error.
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have shown how to take the sampling distribution of estimated summary statistics,μ, into account for parameter inference in a cosmological context. For situations where the naive likelihood is Gaussian, we have evaluated this correction (by marginalising over the unknown µ) for the case with known covariance (equation 10) and estimated covariance (equation 15).
We have validated the corrected likelihood with a toy model (Section 4). Using JLA SN Ia data, we have demonstrated the effect of the corrected likelihood on cosmological parameter inference. For model selection, in our simple three-parameter inference demonstration, we show that the log Bayesian evidence lnK will be incorrect by a factor of over 30 if the uncorrected likelihood is not used.
In the era of DES (DES Collaboration et al. 2017 ), LSST (LSST Science Collaboration et al. 2009 ) and Euclid (Amendola et al. 2016) , cosmological analyses will have access to large cosmological data sets. Sole reliance on 2-point statistics in the linear regime will be tantamount to wasting data which is rich in cosmological information. However, many summary statistics (µ) that access information beyond these 2-point statistics in the linear regime cannot be calculated analytically and need realistic simulations to be run to estimateμ.
A typical approach has been to run an excessive number of simulations at each position in parameter space, such that the variance ofμ in negligible. This approach has diminishing returns, as variance asymtopically tends to zero as 1 M . This effectively aims to increase the number of simulations M until the sampling distribution P(μ | µ, M, α) is a Dirac delta function. Accepting a small increase in the resulting parameter constraints and correcting the likelihood for this sampling distribution means that fewer simulations have to be run.
If one does not wish to take the sampling distribution into account, one might use "cheap" simulations where it is possible to run enough that one effectively reaches the Dirac delta function limit. This has two potential pitfalls: firstly, the limit is never truly reached, which may affect the inferred parameters or model comparison results; secondly, cheap simulations are likely to be less realistic. It is far better to have slightly broader posterior distributions and to have used reliable simulations, than to have tighter constrains on parameters that are biased due to unreliable simulations.
The approach taken in this paper requires the acceptance that simulations are not "free". Simulations are increasingly an essential part of analyses. Like data, reliable simulations are often expensive in terms of time and resources and are, therefore, an acceptable contribution to the uncertainty of inferred parameters.
